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Abstract—Recently, the Android platform has seen its number
of malicious applications increased sharply. Motivated by the easy
application submission process and the number of alternative
market places for distributing Android applications, rogue au-
thors are developing constantly new malicious programs. While
current anti-virus software mainly relies on signature detection,
the issue of alternative malware detection has to be addressed.
In this paper, we present a feature based detection mechanism
relying on opcode-sequences combined with machine learning
techniques. We assess our tool on both a reference dataset known
as Genome Project as well as on a wider sample of 40,000
applications retrieved from the Google Play Store.
Keywords—Android malware, opcode-sequences, machine
learning
I. INTRODUCTION
Over the last year, Android became the most used mobile
Operating System around the world with more than 500 million
devices already activated and around 1.3 million activations
every single day 1. This context makes Android attractive
for users, developers and also the attackers who can develop
and distribute malware easily. While anti-virus vendors do
not agree on the market shares of malware owned by the
Android OS, they acknowledge that this is the favourite target
of rogue authors to spread mobile malware2 3. Google reacted
in setting up Google Bouncer, which scans applications before
submission. However, according to a Karspersky security bul-
letin4, no significant change has been observed. Researchers
[1] have found ways to bypass the Google Bouncer in finger-
printing the Android emulator used by the service. In order
to thwart those threats, anti-viruses vendors adapted their
detection mechanisms to Android applications. Since it uses
signature based detection, this approach is designed to catch
only known threats [2]. Detecting Android malware is not an
easy task. Dynamic approaches must take into account the
multi-entry points issue due to the component-based paradigm
of Android, whereas static approaches must deal with known
1http://news.cnet.com/8301-1035 3-57510994-94/
google-500-million-android-\devices-activated/: accessed on 2013-03-20
2http://thehackernews.com/2013/03/google-f-secure-can-say-that-anything.
html accessed on 2013-03-20
3http://www.securelist.com/en/analysis/204792255/Kaspersky Security
Bulletin 2012 The overall statistics for 2012 accessed on 2013-03-20
4http://www.securelist.com/en/analysis/204792255/Kaspersky Security
Bulletin 2012 The overall statistics for 2012 accessed on 2013-03-20
Figure 1. A method translated into a 3-grams vector
obfuscation techniques5. In this paper, we propose a static
approach combining opcode-sequences and machine learning
techniques. To the best of our knowledge no previous approach
tackled Android malware detection using this technique. We
sum up here the contributions of this paper:
• We present an approach based on opcode-sequences
that we assessed on a reference Android malware
dataset available for the research community;
• We propose a realistic assessment on a snapshot of the
Google Play Store - retrieved in the first six months
of 2012 – in order to test the validity in a real life
scenario. ;
• We compare our approach with several well-known
anti-virus products;
• We give access to a dataset of applications that our
tool detected as malicious while anti-virus packages
did not.
In the section II we present our approach and continue then
with the results on a reference dataset in section III. We review
the related works in section IV and concluded the paper in the
section V.
II. APPROACH
A. Feature Extraction
Known feature sets that have already been used in the past
to detect malicious programs: n-grams [4], opcodes [5], An-
droid permissions combined with Control Flow Graphs [6] and
5http://www.dexlabs.org/blog/bytecode-obfuscation accessed on 2013-03-
20
several others. Finding the feature set that generalizes the most
our observable is the most challenging task. Opcode-sequences
that we will refer as k-grams, have already proven their
efficiency to classify Windows binaries [7], [8], [9]. However,
we opted for a slightly different approach based on opcode-
sequence occurrence, introduced further. It is worth noting
that we are using opcodes without their related operands.
The reason is that operands can be easily changed in altering
register indexes. In addition, this can be done without affecting
the control flow of execution. Opcodes are extracted from the
classes.dex file and must be translated into opcode-sequences.
Figure 1 depicts how a method is translated into opcode-
sequences of length three.
B. Overall Architecture
The classification mechanism is split into two parts, the first
aims at building the model according to the machine learning
algorithm and the second uses this model as input to classify
unknown applications. Since our approach relies on supervised
learning, we need only labelled instances to build a model. To
build a tool able to classify Android applications we process
as follows:
• Collect all the possible k-grams in all the set of
applications as an initial feature set
• Apply a selection algorithm in order to determine the
most relevant features;
• Create a model using these relevant feature set
• Use this model to classify unknown applications.
Instead of using the weighted frequency of opcode-
sequences, as used in [7], [8], [9], we collect binary occur-
rences of k-grams. In using binary count, we characterize
the minimal functionalities required by a program to function
properly. On the contrary, if extracting weighted opcode-
sequence frequencies, the whole structure of a program is
represented. The advantage of using binary count is that the
total number of opcode-sequences is not required.
C. Classification Mechanism
Machine-learning-based detection has already been used
for detecting malicious Android programs [10], [6]; never-
theless, as far as we know, none of these approaches was
assessed on a wide dataset as ours. In order to find the best
suited algorithm, we tested some well-known implementation
of machine learning algorithm such as libsvm [11] or C 5.06.
As a consequence, we opted for a linear implementation of
SVM – Support Vector Machine – classification known as
liblinear. According to [12], this implementation is adapted
to process both a large amount of instances and features.
We used a smart feature selection so that only significant
features remain to build the model. The initial number of fea-
tures depends on the k parameter that we choose for opcode-
sequences. We could be tempted to evaluate the maximum
of possible k-grams to Mth = Nk where N = 224 is the
number of permitted opcodes. However, in a real scenario this
6http://www.rulequest.com/see5-info.html
number varies due to opcode semantics. Hence, for k = 5
we could expect to count about 564 billions different k-grams
but we observed Mobs = 5, 998, 223 on a set of 40,000
applications. We used a well-known feature selection based
on the information gain computed for each feature. It aims at
computing the information brought by each feature compared
to the information brought by the labels. The formal definition
of the information gain for a feature f ∈ F , where F is the
set of all features, is :
IG(Ex, f) = H(Ex)−H(Ex|f) (1)
H(Ex|f) =
∑
v∈vals(f)
|{x∈Ex|val(x,f)=v}|
|Ex| (2)
·H({x ∈ Ex|val(x, f) = v}) (3)
where Ex represents the set of all instances to study, val(x, f)
is the value of the attribute f ∈ F of the instance x and H is
the Shannon’s entropy function.
Once computed for each feature, we can rank opcode-
sequences according to their information gain. This ranking is
used afterwards to reduce our feature set in keeping only the
most significant features and thereby reduce the information
loss.
III. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
We run our experiments on the Genome Project’s dataset
introduced in [13]. We choose to use this dataset as a ground
truth since it contains only malicious programs that were
checked manually by analysts. We are making our work
comparable with other approaches since the dataset is openly
available.
A. Experiments Description
As no goodware dataset has been published, we are running
our experiments on ten different subsets of 1,246 Android ap-
plications randomly picked from the Android market. We use
ten different datasets in order to work with balanced datasets
and thus avoid overfitting problems. We define a goodware
dataset as being a collection of applications that does not
contain any instance of malicious applications present in the
malicious set. We define the metrics that need to be computed
to evaluate classification performances. The true positives
rate TPrate and true negatives rates TNrate are defined as
TPrate =
TP
TP+FN and respectively TNrate =
TN
TN+FP . These
metrics represent percentages of well classified instances over
each class – malign and benign in our case . Assuming that
positive stands for malign applications and negative for benign
instances, the recall is defined as Recallmalign = TPrate
and Recallbenign = TNrate. Another interesting measure
is the precision where Precisionmalign = TPTP+FP and
Precisionbenign =
TN
TN+FN . Precision measures the likeli-
hood of good prediction while recall measures probability of
good retrieving. Finally, F-measure is defined as F-measurec =
2·Precisionc·Recallc
Precisionc+Recallc
, where c denotes the class considered. We
choose the average F-measure to evaluate tool performances
because it takes into account both Recall and Precision while
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Figure 3. F-measure variation for dataset number one
classification accuracy only considers the Recall values of both
classes.
In order to find the best value for k, we run ten-fold
cross-validation experiments on each combination of mal-
ware/goodware datasets. In addition, we limited the number
of features to the 200,000 highest information-gain features.
We needed to do this for performance reasons since for k = 5
we extracted N = 1, 305, 511 different features for only one
malware/goodware combination. Figure 2 shows the results for
different combinations of malware/goodware datasets. These
distributions have been plotted considering the average F-
measure over classes for each fold of each run. We can
see that the best results are obtained for k = 5. Another
good property for 5 − grams is the squeezed shape of the
distribution. This means that the results are more steady among
the several runs. The choice of the benign dataset has a
small impact on classification results. Indeed, we observed a
low standard deviation of the average F-measure computed
per dataset. The standard deviation among ten datasets is
F-measurestdev = 0.0027 for k = 5. This means that our
work can be easily compared with other approaches using the
Genome Project’s dataset.
Figure 2 shows that the length k = 5 provides the best
results in term of classification. The classification capabilities
are not affected by the choice of the benign dataset. The best
classification performances that can be expected are the same
as those obtained with 200,000 features. As a consequence,
we minimize the number of features in targeting an average
F-Measure as close as possible to F-Measuretarget = 0.9771.
Figure 3 depicts the F-measure obtained among classes as well
as the average when the number of features varies. This curve
was obtained with ten-fold cross-validation. Good classifica-
tion results with only few features can be achieved. Indeed
with 2,000 features, we are able to get good classification
performances since F-Measure > 0.95. We also observe that
classification results become steady around 70,000 features.
This number of features is sound since F-Measure70,000 =
0.9759, which is the closer value to F-Measuretarget = 0.9771.
Figure I shows the the ten most significant opcode-sequences.
Some sequences are specific to a certain class of applications,
where opcode-sequences two,six,nine and ten are seen only in
malware.
Table I. TOP TEN OPCODE-SEQUENCES
0x13 0x6e 0x6e 0x6e 0x0c
const/16
invoke-virtual
invoke-virtual
invoke-virtual
move-result-object
0x1c 0x6e 0x6e 0x0c 0x6e
const-class
invoke-virtual
invoke-virtual
move-result-object
invoke-virtual
0x1d 0x54 0x6e 0x0a 0x39
monitor-enter
iget-object
invoke-virtual
move-result
if-nez
0x21 0x01 0x35 0x46 0x1a
array-length
move
if-ge
aget-object
const-string
0x0c 0x1a 0x6e 0x0a 0x33
move-result-object
const-string
invoke-virtual
move-result
if-ne
0x12 0x12 0x3c 0x0e 0x22
const/4
const/4
if-gtz
return void
new-instance
0x71 0x54 0x62 0x6e 0x28
invoke-static
iget-object
sget-object
invoke-virtual
goto
0x6e 0x28 0x20 0x38 0x1f
invoke-virtual
goto
instance-of
if-eqz
check-cast
0x0d 0x07 0x6e 0x28 0x9c
move-exception
move-object
invoke-virtual
goto
sub-long
0x16 0x31 0x3d 0x74 0x0e
const-wide/16
cmp-long
if-lez
invoke-virtual/range
return void
We trained our detection tool on a labelled dataset obtained
from VirusTotal7. We evaluate the model on a training set
made of a snapshot of the Android Market retrieved during the
first six months of 2012. We further compare our results with
the results given by some anti-virus software available in the
VirusTotal engine. As far as we know, no previous academic
work concerning Android malware detection gave access to
tools or datasets. This is the reason why we do not compare
our approach with previous works done in this area of research.
B. Dataset Introduction
The dataset used in this experiment contains three parts. We
gathered two datasets from VirusTotal, one containing 25,476
malware and another containing 15,670 benign applications.
We also got access to 42,062 Android applications downloaded
from the official Google Play Store market. In order to build
a relevant model, we define hereafter which applications we
7https://www.virustotal.com
Table II. DATASETS SUMMARY
Benign Malign
Retrieved from VirusTotal
Total 15,670 25,476
Unique by SHA 256 15,670 25,476
After filtering 12,905 11,960
Retrieved from Google Play
Total 35,657 6,405
unique by SHA 256 35,700 6,135
Overlap with files in model 389 31
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Figure 4. Comparison with top 25 anti-virus packages
Table III. CONFUSION MATRIX
Rec.ben. Rec.mal. Prec.ben. Prec.mal. F-measure
97.33% 81.40% 83.95% 96.83% 0.8931
consider as malicious for the training phase. Among a pre-
liminary study on this dataset we observed many detections
such as adware like Airpush, Leadbolt or Wooboo8. However,
when we looked at such adware description, none of it states
clearly that this family can be fully considered as malware.
To deal with this issue, we deleted each application detected
as adware. To reduce noise in the training set we choose to
use only files that raised at least three alarms out of 46, after
adware filtering. On our benign dataset we applied a filtering
step as well, consisting in removing applications being signed
with a certificate that signed at least one application detected
as malware. We started the filtering process from respectively
15,670 benign and 22,476 malign instances. After filtering,
12,905 instances from the benign class and 11,960 malign
applications remained. To avoid balancing issues between the
two datasets, we opted for a down-sampling strategy regarding
the benign class. Table II summarizes both the training and
testing datasets.
C. Results
The precision malicious means that an unknown applica-
tion scanned by our tool will have 96.83% of likelihood to
be also detected as such by at least one anti-virus product
embedded in VirusTotal. Similarly, 83.95% of apps classified
as benign by our tool will remain undetected by VirusTotal.
8http://www.networkworld.com/news/2012/
102212-trendmicro-android-malware-263542.html accessed on 2013-03-
21
As the total number of malign and benign instances are
different, we weighted the results in order to compute the
precision metrics. The true negatives rate respectively Rec.ben.
in table III means that when VirusTotal does not raise any
alert, we classify applications as benign in 97.33% of cases.
The true positives rate Rec.mal corresponds to the likelihood
of agreeing with VirusTotal when it raises at least one alert
for an application. We conclude that in spite of the same
knowledge basis as VirusTotal, our tool has different results.
This is another drawback when we want to scale up such a
detection mechanism. The fundamental problem is that we do
not really now if VirusTotal is right in 100% of cases. Indeed
when we assume an application as malicious if it raises at
least one alert, we are exposed to the false positives rate of
each anti-virus package. As comparing directly our tool to
VirusTotal is biased by anti-virus software false positives rates,
we propose to compare it directly to each software embedded
in VirusTotal. Figure 4 shows a comparison, in term of number
of detections, between our approach and the top 25 anti-virus
packages available in VirusTotal. We define the top 25 anti-
virus packages as being the 25 software that detected the
most malicious applications among our testing set. For the
chart, these were ordered by detection rate in descending order.
We can consider as first example the comparison with ESET-
NOD329.
• Left to right stripes (yellow): our tool detected 918
applications that ESET-NOD32 did not;
• Right to left stripes (orange): 4296 applications were
detected by both tools;
• No stripes (red): 554 were detected only by ESET-
NOD32;
• Crossed stripes (green): 677 were not detected by both
tool, but at least once by another anti-virus software.
In spite of its poor classification results when compared
with VirusTotal, the tool detects more rogue applications than
all anti-virus products taken individually. We can also notice
that our approach does not mimicry neither VirusTotal nor a
given anti-virus product.
We relied on digital certificates to gather some hints
about misclassified applications. When building a classifi-
cation mechanism we must deal with false positives and
false negatives. As we observe in Table III, we have 2,143
misclassified instances when compared with VirusTotal. To
get the exact classification results, one should analyse each
of them. However, completely reverse engineering Android
applications for analysis is a long and tedious process. This
is the reason why we used a lightweight method to reduce
this amount of applications to analyse and thus avoid reverse
engineering. Throughout a preliminary analysis of the datasets,
we noticed interesting signature patterns for applications. As
depicts Figure 5, certificates signing malware, tend to sign
more applications than other certificates do. In this histogram,
we plot on the x axis the number of applications signed by
a given certificate and on the y axis the frequency of such a
signature pattern over the datasets. We rely on a method to
9http://www.eset.com/us/
quickly identify potentially malicious sets of applications. We
extracted certificates from all applications presented in Table
II. Concerning false negatives, we see on Figure 5 that the
signing pattern is closer to the pattern observed for malware.
This is not surprising since we discarded adware from our
training set. In this false negative set we noticed that only 90
were not adware. However, this is not this set of applications
which is problematic since these have already been identified
as malicious by analysts.
Table IV. AVERAGE ESTIMATOR FOR DIFFERENT CONFIDENCE
INTERVALS
N sample mean sample stdev CI 99%
benign 8319 1.60 2.92 1.51 < µ < 1.68
malign 5486 4.63 35.12 3.41 < µ < 5.85
false positives 420 1.81 4.10 1.29 < µ < 2.33
Applications that would really need to be analysed are in
the false negative set. We searched for applications that were
signed by certificates that already signed a malign application.
We found that among these 952 apps, 194 were signed by
a certificate that had already signed at least one application
detected by VirusTotal. Thus, we can isolate this set of
applications for a future analysis. In addition, we estimated the
average number of applications signed by a given certificate
in Table IV. In this table µ estimates the average number of
applications signed by certificate, for each population. These
estimations confirm that we can consider the signature pattern
as being different between malign and benign applications.
Knowing this, we propose a method to find applications with
a high likelihood of maliciousness. We isolate suspicious
certificate according to a threshold T = f(µ, σ) characterizing
the number of applications signed. Once suspicious certificates
are identified, we can find the applications signed and isolate
them. As a result in taking the upper bound of the estimated
mean µ with a confidence interval of 99%; we can isolate 128
applications in considering certificates that signed more than
11 applications. This value is obtained in setting the threshold
to T = µ + 3σ for the benign population. Considering a
normal distribution, over T = µ + 3σ only 0.135% of the
population is represented. Hence, in selecting only certificates
over this threshold, we isolate only outliers. In using this
method, combined with the malicious certificate check, we
can divide the set of applications to analyse by three since we
isolated 322 applications over 952. Another advantage of this
method is that we increase the likelihood of finding malware
inside this subset. In studying signature pattern we also observe
malicious behaviour that may explain why these applications
were detected as malicious by our classification approach.
IV. RELATED WORK
In [15] the authors present JuxtApp, an Hadoop-based
approach that extracts k-grams from basic blocks in order to
detect similarities between two applications. DroidMoss [16]
is another approach dealing with the similarity detection issue
in using opcode. Firstly, all opcodes are extracted from appli-
cations and then a piecewise hashing is computed to compare
applications. In [17] the authors present a dataset of 46 mal-
ware ranging from malware, personal spyware and grayware.
They also present the current incentives of rogue authors as
well as future motivations. The dataset of malware that we use
Figure 5. Applications signed by certificate
in this paper has been introduced in [18], this collection gathers
1,260 malicious programs ordered in 49 families. Andromaly,
a machine learning-based detection technique, is introduced
in [19]. The tool monitors memory use, calls, SMS as well as
many other dynamic features. In [20] RiskRanker is presented,
this approach aims at detecting applications having suspicious.
This is performed through Control Flow Graph analysis as well
as in looking for suspicious API use. Another static detection
mechanism is presented in [13] where the authors present
DroidRanger. This tool uses heuristics extraction and dynamic
execution monitoring in order to detect unknown threats. In
addition, the approach leverage a signature based detection to
identify known threats. A dynamic approach is presented in
[21] where the authors proposed a syscall monitoring approach
further used to identify malicious signatures. Batyuk et al.
introduce in [22] a solution aiming at disassembling code
and looking at malicious API use. DroidMat [10] extracts
information about Intent, API calls and permissions in order
to classify applications in using clustering techniques. In
[6], the authors use Permissions and Control Flow Graph in
order to detect malicious pattern user the One Class SVM
algorithm. Two remote analysis approaches are introduced in
[23] and [24]. Crowdroid[23], the former approach, firstly
collects syscalls on the phone and then it uses these feature
on a remote server to detect anomaly. Walldroid[24] is an
application based firewall aiming at detecting and blocking
communications between smartphones and malicious servers.
In [25], Grace et al. observed strange behaviours in several
in-app advertisement libraries. Some of them are loading
code dynamically, using code obfuscation in using the Java
Reflection API, reading SMSs, accessing contacts or even
starting GPS. Addressing the same topic, [26] shows that 56%
of applications with ads access location through the ad library
and that 23% of applications are using less privileges than the
advertisement library it embeds.
V. FUTURE WORK AND CONCLUSION
We have presented in this paper an efficient approach
to classify Android applications and thus to detect Android
malware. Our approach has the same limits that any supervised
machine learning approach. It will not detect completely
different malware. The evasion that could completely fool
our approach is advanced bytecode-level obfuscation - for
instance, in transforming the bytecode into a semantically
equivalent program - since it would alter directly opcode-
sequences. There are several commercial solutions capable
of obfuscating Android applications. Nevertheless, as far as
we know, only Proguard the default Android obfuscator is
freely available. Our approach is not sensible to the Proguard
obfuscation process since only method names and class names
are modified by this obfuscation tool. Although advanced
obfuscation techniques have been reviewed in [14] we do not
know any tool capable of doing this automatically. We provide
an open access to the datasets used for the experiments10
presented in this paper. In addition, we give access to our
dataset of applications identified as malicious in this paper
and not detected by VirusTotal. This access can be given in
contacting us by email.
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